Speaking Lukashenko

The Belarusian President has a lot to say, and we should listen

As the Ukrainian counter-offensive reaches a disappointing conclusion, many are making their interpretations of the conflict known. A slew of articles have come out painting a dark picture for Ukraine based on the current strategic outlook, while citing the conflict in Gaza taking attention away from the conflict with Russia as a evidence that international support is waning. The grim and foreboding inevitability presented by these reports is ‘entering into negotiations’, although what those negotiations would involve is anyone’s guess. Perspectives from Russia have been basically nonexistent on this topic beyond official channels, which makes getting the other side of the story very difficult. Difficult, but not impossible. While Russia itself maintains effective radio silence, a close ally seems to be one of the few ways to get an idea of how Russia’s top brass may be feeling about the conflict.

Storytime: In January of 2022, I was starting an economics course on global development. The final paper was about the development prospects of a country of our choice. My choice was going to be Rwanda, but I got to the Google Docs form late, and that country was taken by someone else. Instead, I decided to pick another country led by a despotic but ultimately very competent president for over 20 years: Belarus. The project became a lot harder to research once the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’ was initiated by Russia (which Belarus is extremely closely tied with) a week after I filled out that form. Half of the final 18 pages of that paper ended up being about President Aleksandr Lukashenko and how his Soviet inspired rule of Belarus influenced its development over the past 30 years.

I’ve always been a big Lukashenko fan. Maybe not on a lot of policies, but he has a style that I personally find very interesting. The former Soviet agricultural bureaucrat maneuvered his way through the politics of a disintegrating USSR to eventually secure the office of president in 1994. In his first term as president, Lukashenko notably resisted the so-called ‘economic shock therapy’ that Russia was being subjected to. Lukashenko has held on to power since, partially thanks to his close relationship with Putin, and partially because he’s done a fairly good job maintaining his country. Belarus has experienced slightly lower GDP per capita growth rates compared to Russia (3.79 vs 4.06) and is sitting at about half the total per capita GDP of Russia. But in terms of inequality, Belarus has a GINI coefficient over twice that of Russia’s (75.6 vs 36), meaning the newly created wealth has been split much more evenly. 

The Belarusian president’s biggest PR coup in recent memory came this summer when he successfully defused an attempted PR(igozhin) coup by the Wagner Group. By opening communications with mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and offering his army safe harbor in Belarus, Lukashenko secured himself a small personal army for free along with the rare goodwill of an increasingly paranoid Vladimir Putin. Lukashenko went from a dopey sidekick to an experienced and clever statesman in the eyes of many.

Recently, Lukashenko has made some interesting statements on the war. On October 27th, Lukashenko urged Ukraine to begin peace negotiations “as soon as possible”. The statement was published on BelTa (state-owned media of Belarus) and outlined how Ukraine should recognize its stalemate before more people are killed. Looking on Twitter for posts about Lukashenko yielded very few hits discussing these comments, mainly it was everyone’s favorite globetrotting Austrian man who was possibly taunting the Serbian government to shoot down the plane he was on, or to be his friend finally.

Although Lukashenko didn't name what the negotiations should entail for Ukraine, his insistence on an end to the conflict is a sign that some of Putin’s closest allies do not have a maximalist vision in mind for the war. This isn’t to say Lukashenko is sweating over the possibility of Ukraine defeating Russia outright, but rather that he acknowledges Russia (and by extension, Belarus) would benefit more from a negotiated peace at this point compared to committing to forcing an unconditional surrender by Ukraine or continued low-intensity warfare.

A few days after this statement, on October 30th, Lukashenko made overtures to the European Union, hoping that it would engage in future cooperation with Belarus. Lukashenko has kept a surprisingly pro-EU stance throughout the war, and his continued maintenance of this position is a sign that ending EU sanctions on Russia and Belarus could be a very significant bargaining chip for Ukraine going into negotiations. This desire for normalized trade makes sense for Belarus’ more commodity-dependent big brother. While Russian gas continues to make its way to Europe, decoupling efforts by the European Union and US have hurt Russia’s post-war export prospects.

On November 3rd, Lukashenko offered some comments on Ukraine which could be interpreted in different ways.

“But we are missing the key point: we will not get away from Ukraine. We will have to work in Ukraine. No Americans, the West will help them. Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] and I talk a lot about it. They [Ukrainians] will come to us for aid. A huge amount of work. We will have to help Ukrainians”

Lukashenko’s line about Americans and the West is vague (the Belarusian version of BelTa isn’t any better), but could be implying hopes for future cooperation in rebuilding Ukraine, depending on who “them” is. 

One could argue that Aleksandr Lukashenko is not the best gauge of Russia’s attitudes. To this I would generally agree, the interests and motivations that he has behind his decision-making are very different from Putin. Furthermore, Belarus isn’t engaged in active conflict with its soldiers dying by the thousands, and the intense nationalism which underpins much of the war does not seem to factor heavily into Lukashenko’s rhetoric. What I will say is that Lukashenko is still by far the best person to understand Russia’s interests. His idiosyncratic leadership style combines business, state, and diplomatic interests into one pragmatic voice that is not directly subservient to Putin. While Russia’s battlefield strengths and weaknesses are lauded or downplayed by both sides as the eventual decider of the war, Lukashenko is focused on what actually serves to strengthen the long-term survival of his own country, and by extension, Russia.

Economics are boring in comparison to tanks and fighter jets but is ultimately more important in deciding the outcome of wars. Since the beginning of the war, Russia has not been doing great in terms of its long-term economic prospects. The military budget is set to almost double this year, although the ruble itself is worth significantly less compared to last year. One may think battlefield casualties would be the largest hindrance to the future workforce, but compared to the brain drain since the start of the war, they’re peanuts. 

There is an AP article from July, 2023 stating that Russia has experienced 50k combat fatalities. You could say data is probably flawed for a laundry list of reasons, but let’s stick with it. Many young, skilled Russians have left the country since the start of the war to avoid a draft, political persecution, or simply seek more gainful employment. The total number of Russian citizens that have fled the country since 2022 numbers around 750k, which means that for every dead Russian soldier, 15 skilled workers have left the Russian economy of their own volition. In total, Russia lost 1.33 million young workers in 2022 for one reason or another, with the gaps being only partially filled by the entrance of over 500k workers into the market from the 50-69 age demographic.

Russia’s economy doesn’t appear to be suffering on the battlefield, where Western observers can see it in action, but shows signs that severe fatigue could begin to set in as the war continues. Still, Ukrainian generals can’t depend on shortages of IT workers in Moscow to cause the opening of gaps in Russian trench lines. With enough firepower, Russia can still make Ukraine hurt much more than it’s hurting itself, economically and militarily.

But destruction is not Russia’s end goal in Ukraine either. Currently, Russia does not fully occupy either the Zaporizhzhia or Kherson Oblasts it officially annexed in September of last year. Conceding the entirety of these oblasts would be the bare minimum expected of Ukraine in a peace deal put forward by Russia, although that’s currently a hard ask militarily, especially with the capital of Kherson on the opposite side of the Dnieper River. It’s certainly possible, but would require either another round of mobilization, or maintaining a protracted war of attrition for victory to be anywhere near guaranteed.

The recognition of all these facts is where Lukashenko’s point of view comes from. Unclouded by sunken costs and romantic notions, Lukashenko represents old-school Soviet-style material analysis of the situation at hand. A Belarus style Ukrainian government rigidly aligned with Moscow would be ideal, but that’s not in the cards anymore. A peace deal with Ukraine that granted territorial concessions would be nice, but the more important issue for the future of Russia and Belarus is ultimately maintaining functional economies. The two countries could still make it out of this conflict with more than they walked in with, a resumption of trade akin to pre 2014 levels would lead to

“The president explained that Europe does not want to go to war (…) Aleksandr Lukashenko emphasized that he absolutely supports the existence of the European Union because it is one of the world's pillars” - BelTa

Geopolitically, Lukashenko still sees a future with Europe, and knows that attempting to triumph over adversaries in economic warfare is not a fight he or his allies are in any way guaranteed to win. When I wrote that paper last year, the conclusion I came to was that Belarus’ economic future lay with the European Union. The EU market remained underserved by Belarus mostly due to geopolitical conditions, while Russia had a diversified enough import portfolio to keep Belarusian goods both cheap and substitutable.

Ukraine remains the only lens we can see the ongoing war through in ‘The West”. Talking to a Ukrainian official for a news story is significantly easier than a Russian one, and Ukraine’s partnership with NATO members requires news coverage in those countries. Still, being constrained to one side makes coverage much more focused on what is happening immediately, and doesn’t reflect how historians think about what actually determines the outcomes of wars. Sometimes, you should check in on what an ex-dairy farmer is saying, he might have a more nuanced perspective than you would expect.

For now, a lot of this is just speculation. The 2024 Russian Presidential Election is happening in March, which most expect Putin to win handily, although it has apparently been something the president of Russia is concerned about enough to delay a mobilization drive until after the election. Waiting to begin a round mobilization until early spring is a decision not made lightly, with winter being the time of lowest frontline activity and ideal for training green troops. For now, the eyes of war observers can only remain on the battlefield, if they haven’t wandered further south to Gaza.

If you have any resources/contacts on the upcoming Russian elections, email me at charliemoe@gmail.com or message me on Twitter.